

Columbia University  
in the City of New York

THE LIBRARIES




THE SELIGMAN LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS

PURCHASED BY THE UNIVERSITY

1942

1819 E

A573



ON THE  
**TRADE TO CHINA,**  
AND THE  
**INDIAN ARCHIPELAGO;**  
WITH  
OBSERVATIONS  
ON THE  
INSECURITY OF THE BRITISH INTERESTS IN  
THAT QUARTER.

---

BY CHARLES ASSEY, ESQ.  
LATE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAVA.

---

LONDON:  
PRINTED FOR RODWELL AND MARTIN,  
BOND-STREET.

---

1819.

ON THE

## TRADE TO CHINA.

---

**IT** is proposed, in the following observations, to take a general view of the commerce of the Indian Archipelago, more especially among the native states who are not under the control of a foreign power; to consider in how far that commerce may be advantageous to this country, both in extending the consumption of our staple manufactures, and in the demand for the produce of those states in the China market; and at the same time to point out the insecurity of the present trade from Great Britain and British India to China, if timely measures of precaution be not taken to meet the progress of the Americans in China, and to guard against

the system of exclusive authority which the Netherlands government are endeavouring to establish throughout the Eastern seas. It is not that I expect to offer many new facts relative to the commerce of these countries; but probably a concise explanation of the circumstances already known, may place the subject in a more striking point of view than what it has been supposed to possess; and as questions of the greatest national interest are often underrated or overlooked, merely because the scene of action is distant and not familiar, it becomes the duty of those who from local situation have been more accustomed to give their attention to such matters, to communicate frankly the result of their personal experience. With this view of the subject, I am anxious to point out the probable consequences of leaving a foreign nation to obtain the sole command of the Eastern seas, and to control the trade and industry of the native population of those islands.

And this question is of no trivial importance: there is at the present moment an acknowledged want of field for the employment of the capital of our merchants. Commerce has been carried to an extent which cannot be continued, now that the European nations are at liberty to encourage their domestic manufactures; it has become therefore more necessary than ever to seek for distant markets; and there is a field still open in China and in the Eastern seas, which I think may be obtained without any considerable expense, and without at all interfering with the legitimate rights of other nations.

But the more clearly to explain this question, it is necessary to offer some remarks on the course and nature of the trade in the Indian Archipelago, and on the consumption of the products of these islands in China.

From the earliest times of which there is any

record, the foreign trade in the Indian islands was carried on at certain ports or emporia, to which the native traders resorted with the produce of their respective countries, and bartered it for the commodities of Europe and of China.—Acheen, Malacca, and Bantam, were chief places of this description, until the Dutch established a paramount authority, and by obtaining an exclusive control in the minor ports, were enabled to force the native trade to Batavia. They wished to render this place the emporium of their Eastern possessions, and when they had subdued any of the neighbouring native states, they uniformly exacted the execution of a treaty which stipulated that the produce and trade of the country should be placed at their disposal, and the local port regulations be made subject to their immediate direction ; the consequence of which necessarily was, that they became enabled to change the course of the native trade, (so far as it was not comprehended in their own monopoly), to such

ports as best suited their policy and convenience.

But the native traders have at all times been unwilling to proceed to Batavia; the regulation was contrary to established usage, and to the ordinary and convenient course of their voyage; it was both arbitrary and oppressive; and whenever the Dutch government were too weak to enforce submission, it was evaded. Thus it will be found that Rhio was a place of great resort, although the Dutch would rather have directed the native trade to Malacca; and as soon as the Eastern seas became more free, Penang rose to commercial importance; and a direct intercourse was established between the East India Company's possessions and the Indian Archipelago; and hence it has followed that the British nation has acquired an interest in the commerce of these islands which was not formerly possessed. The mutual relations thus established, have led to an increased consumption of European manufactures among the



Malay tribes, and have tended to improve their habits and condition, by presenting to them a ready and unrestricted sale of the produce of their industry; and the Netherlands government cannot prohibit the continuance of these relations without committing a positive injury on the legitimate rights of Great Britain.

It may also be presumed, that if a conveniently situated port were established under the British flag, that port would be resorted to by the Malay and Chinese traders, in preference to proceeding to Batavia; because such a course would be conformable to former usage and convenience; and, further, because the natives of the Eastern islands have, on more than one occasion, during and since the restitution of Java, evinced a decided preference towards the British nation.

The trade between China and the islands in the Indian Archipelago is of ancient date, and

of considerable extent; the Chinese junks proceed annually to Java, to the Celebes and Suluh Islands, and to the principal ports on the island of Borneo: they also go annually to Palembang on the coast of Sumatra, and to the islands of Bintang and Lingin: their export cargo from China consisting principally of coarse earthenware and silks, together with various articles of domestic consumption among the Chinese settlers residing on the different islands: gongs also are a great article of export from China to Borneo. In return the junks receive sugar from Java; tin from Banca\*; and from almost all the islands, edible birds'-nests†, tripang

\* The Chinese prefer the Banca tin to any other, and will pay about  $\frac{1}{7}$ th more for it than for the Cornish tin. The greater part of the tin procured in Banca is sent to the China market; and the quantity obtained from the Banca mines has been as follows:

In the year 1814——19,149 pecculs, of 133lbs. per peccul.

1815——25,190

1816——26,677

† The birds'-nests are distinguished by the Chinese by the names of Pashat and Chikot, and each kind is divided into three classes of best, middle, and inferior quality; the sale is

(otherwise called sea-slug) a kind of holithurea, and some other articles which are among the luxuries of a Chinese epicure ; besides rattans, wax, woods employed in dying, and other such products of woody uncultivated countries.

There is moreover a considerable native trade among the islands themselves : Java supplies most of them with salt and with cotton cloths : gambier is a very principal article of export from Bintang : iron is found in Borneo, and exported from Banjarmassin to Pontiana, where it sells at a higher rate than the European iron : these, with rattans, mats, dammar, agar-agar,

so certain that birds'-nests are considered equivalent to specie, and the average selling price of the two kinds has been estimated to be, the Pashat at 3,200 Spanish dollars, the Chikot at 2,200 Spanish dollars per pecul. It is estimated that more than 200 peculs of birds'-nests are annually imported at Canton, and that the supply might be extended to 500 peculs, without much risk of lowering the sale price.

Sea-slug is of several kinds, and varies in estimation accordingly—the average sale price of the whole may be calculated at about 65 Spanish dollars per pecul, and the annual demand is not less than 400 peculs.

(a species of sea-weed which is used for food), and other minor articles in common use, furnish cargoes to the numerous vessels that trade along the coasts in the Eastern seas, and shew the extent of the trade that might be looked for if the native population were allowed the fair progress, which in the ordinary course of the human mind they would attain to, if they were not restrained by the shackles which European policy imposes on them.

But I proceed to a more particular notice of the ground that had not been occupied, by any European power, at the date of the latest advices from Batavia.

The convention concluded between Great Britain and the Netherlands in the year 1814, has restored to the latter government the factories and establishments which the Dutch held in the year 1803. This restitution has comprehended Java, the Moluccas, and Celebes, with their respective dependencies; but it does not

express that the Netherlands government shall, under this convention, have a right to resume factories or establishments which were not in the year 1803 actually held or administered by the Dutch ; and it may reasonably be doubted, whether it was intended to convey the restitution of those establishments which the Dutch had abandoned between the year 1803, and the date of the signature of the convention.

On the decision that may be taken on these different views of the subject, the present field in the Indian seas becomes more or less narrowed. If it be admitted that such positions as were not held by the Dutch in the year 1803, have not been given up to them by this country, all the establishments which have been resumed for the Netherlands government on the Western coast of Borneo, since the restitution of Java was carried into effect, become open to further consideration and discussion ; and if a formal abandonment of factories held in the year 1803, has excluded such factories from the terms of

the convention above alluded to, Banjarmassin, on the South-east coast of Borneo, does not belong to the Netherlands government by virtue of that convention.

It is indeed stated in the latest accounts from India, that the present authorities at Batavia have not only re-occupied all the possessions which the Dutch at any time held in Borneo, but have also declared the Netherlands government to be the sovereign of that island, and have it in contemplation to place the whole Archipelago under one general system which shall secure the monopoly of its commerce in their own hands, and exclude other nations from any direct participation or access ; but it can hardly be argued that these more recent arrangements, which would materially affect the rights and interests of this country, and were not included, nor perhaps imagined, when the convention of 1814 was framed, can be considered conclusive until they are found to be consistent with the system of political relations in Europe.

On the present occasion then it may be assumed, that those islands or countries which are not comprehended in the cluster of the Moluccas or Celebes, and have not been actually restored under the convention which was concluded with the Netherlands government in the year 1814, constitute a field that is still open in the Eastern seas: Java, of course, does not come within the scope of the argument; and Bâli, though not actually occupied by the Dutch, is too near to their establishments to be, alone, worthy of consideration. I proceed therefore to notice the commercial facilities within the space that remains open; tracing the different positions round the Eastern and Northern coast of Borneo, to the Straits of Sincapore.

The Suluh islands, and that part of Borneo which is dependent or tributary to them, come first in this track, and may be considered to include Magindano and the other islands,

which do not acknowledge the authority of the European government at Macassar.

A mission was sent to them from Batavia, in the year 1814, for the purpose of renewing the treaty which had been concluded in 1774, when the island of Balambangan was taken possession of, and the authority of the Suluh government in Borneo was transferred to the East India Company. It appears from the information then obtained, that the government of the Suluhs is nominally administered by a despotic sovereign, but is in fact controlled by a few powerful chiefs, who are the proprietors of the greater part of the armed vessels, which, under the general name of *Ladrones*, scour the adjacent seas, and plunder indiscriminately whatever falls in their way. The native chiefs in Magindano, and of the extensive settlement in Celebes called *Tantoli*, are also connected with them, and it is estimated that the collective strength of these piratical establishments will amount to about 200 armed prows, of different strength and di-



mensions, and from six to seven thousand fighting men. They make descents on the neighbouring islands, and generally lay waste the country where they land, and carry off the inhabitants, whom they afterwards sell or employ as slaves\*. On their return the booty is divided, and one-fourth of it falls to the share of the Sultan and his principal chiefs.

The great Suluh island is the principal market for the sale of their plunder; and the Magindano pirates resort thither for the same purpose; but besides this traffic, there is a regular trade, principally with the annual junks from China, and, by tacit agreement, no violence or interruption is offered to it. The junks bring

\* The following has been stated to have been the amount of plunder in the year 1813-14.

A Spanish brig from Manila.

Twenty small craft captured among the Philippines.

About 1000 slaves, Christian inhabitants of the Philippines.

A large coasting vessel from Macassar, the commander of which was ransomed for 120 Spanish dollars.

And some small craft in the Moluccas.

European manufactures, and coarse China goods; and they convey back camphor, birds' nests, betle-nut, rattans, &c. including about 220 tons of mother of pearl shell, and a small quantity of pearls.

Of the island of Borneo, and especially the Bay of Malludu and the division termed Borneo Proper on the north and north-west coast, the following account has been given by the late Dr. Leyden. "Borneo Proper is one of the states which grows rice enough for its own consumption; its camphor is the best in the world, but does not exceed the annual quantity of 35 peculs of 133 pounds per pecul. When the original settlement was formed in Balambangan in 1774, Mr. Jesse found that not more than 4000 peculs were produced; and I understand the country still produces pepper equal at least to that quantity. The trade between Borneo and the Chinese port Ammoy is very considerable; according to Foster there were seven junks at Borneo in 1775, and the return car-

goes procured by the Chinese are chiefly camphor, sea-slug, tortoise-shell, birds'-nests, dammer, sandal-wood, rattans, and various articles used in dying.

“ The commodities produced at Malludu are nearly the same as at Borneo Proper ; it abounds particularly in rattans and clove bark, and is reckoned well-peopled in the interior. It has a deep bay, on the east side of which are pearl banks. Magindano, the most easterly district of Borneo, and dependent on the Suluhs, produces gold, birds'-nests, the species of red wood called lakka, and some camphor. Considerable quantities of sea-slug and tortoise-shell may also be procured from the numerous shoals and islets along the coast.”

These extracts serve to confirm the observations already made on the subject of the general produce of the Eastern islands ; and it may be assumed from them, that although the commodities thus to be immediately obtained

would not of themselves furnish a return-cargo of sufficient value to repay a direct commercial intercourse with the north and north-east coast of Borneo, there is abundant ground for considering it an auxiliary in a general plan, the object of which would be, to encourage and protect a coasting trade, in order to collect articles for the China market in exchange for the manufactures of Europe.

But it is not in this temporary point of view only that the subject ought to be contemplated: enough is known of the island of Borneo, to justify a conclusion that it promises to prove in time abundantly profitable. The range of mountains in which the gold-mines of Mampawa are situated extend also to the northward; gold and diamonds have been found in other parts of Borneo, and to all appearance are abundant; a frequency of commercial intercourse with the people, and the increase of wants that would arise from it, would no doubt lead to the usual course of civilization, con-

sumption, and demand. We know of nothing that should interrupt this ordinary progress ; and even if it be not thought expedient to incur the immediate expense of forming an establishment, it must be prudent to interfere, lest other nations establish themselves to our exclusion. Let this be effected, and let the natives be encouraged by a free trade to their ports, it may be expected that the full advantage will result in due time.

The Eastern islands undoubtedly contain a very considerable mart for the sale of British manufactures. Broad cloths are highly prized by the natives, and the demand for them would augment in proportion to the means of purchasing. Some kinds of hardware manufactures would find a ready sale ; iron is in demand, particularly the Swedish ; and the experience of late years has shewn that cotton cloths, manufactured in this country in imitation of Malay patterns, can be exported and sold below the local sale price of the native manufacture.—

This single fact is decisive of the importance and extent to which the Eastern trade might be carried. That it is a fact may be proved on reference to the results of the last year, when these cotton cloths have found a ready and advantageous sale, while the colonial markets have been otherwise so overstocked with European goods, that they scarcely have repaid the prime cost. In short, the practicability of extending the demand for this species of manufacture\* is bounded only by the means of access to the native population; and, as a general remark, applicable to almost every branch of European export, it may be observed, that as the inhabitants of the Indian islands are acknowledged to be free from those peculiar habits and prejudices which restrict the use of European luxuries among the Hindoo tribes, there is no reason

\* It is somewhat curious to trace the course of this trade. Raw cotton imported from Bengal and Bombay (where it is grown) is manufactured in Great Britain, and re-exported in its manufactured state to a sure market. It would be difficult to conceive a trade more beneficial to the mother country throughout its progress.

why an increase of civilization and wealth among them should not lead to an increased demand for the luxuries of civilized society.

Thus far the subject has been considered principally with reference to the extension of a direct trade from Europe; but there is still another branch of it that ought not to be overlooked, which is the commercial intercourse that has of late years been carried on between these islands and the possessions of the East India Company. By a report framed at Penang, it appears that 2100 chests of opium were exported from that settlement in the year 1813-14 to different Eastern markets exclusive of China; and I have been informed that about 45 peculs of gold dust were received at Sambas and Pontiana, during the same year, on account of cargoes sold at those places. Notwithstanding, therefore, that the market will have become greatly contracted in consequence of the produce of the island of Java being no longer available as a return for the cargoes exported

from British India to the Eastern islands, there might still be a valuable trade carried on with the independent native states; more especially when it is considered that this trade would lie near the ordinary track of ships proceeding from British India to Canton; and consequently the mercantile interests in India would be materially injured by any measure which tended to establish a monopoly of the trade of those islands.

The same course of argument is equally applicable with reference to the existing British trade at Canton. Edible birds'-nests, sea slug, and the various articles of lesser value which are also among the luxuries of the Chinese table; are the produce of the Indian islands, and find a ready sale in China; on the other hand, our woollen manufactures are in use throughout the Chinese empire, and are exported from thence to Japan; and I understand that the demand for our cotton goods has very rapidly and materially increased in China within



these last few years, and promises to become even more productive\*. This fact leads to a conclusion, that by combining both sources of supply, by exporting British manufactures to the Indian market and there collecting the local products which are sure of a ready sale in China, our domestic manufactures would find additional vend, and our trade to China would acquire importance in the estimation of the Chinese themselves, a point of no small consequence at any time, and especially now, when the Americans are making rapid strides, and threaten to acquire a superiority in the China trade.

It would hardly, perhaps, be believed that their progress was so considerable; but it is a serious fact, that in the last year 1817-18, the trade from America to China employed 7,000,000 dollars, and 16,000 tons of ship-

\* This furnishes another proof of the importance of protecting and encouraging the course of the cotton manufacture, which has already been alluded to.

ping, while, during the same period of time, the British trade to China occupied 6,500,000 dollars, and 20,000 tons of shipping; and consequently, allowing that the American merchant receives his return in the course of one year while the British requires nearly ten years, the American trade to China is already more extensive than our own. Yet still, though the encroachments of the Americans are matter of daily complaint, though their means of future aggression go on increasing, and their present attitude denotes an indifference, if not something more than indifference, towards the opinion of this country, no means are taken to meet their progress, or to occupy those commercial resources which might enable us the better to compete with them.

Among the Indian islands, the native trade along the northern coast of Sumatra is exclusively in the hands of the Americans: the comparative cheapness with which the American merchants navigate their vessels, and the quick-

ness with which they obtain their return cargo (for the plain and obvious reason that they are not delayed by official forms, but each individual sells his goods as he can), enables them to give a higher price for colonial produce than the British merchant can afford to give. They usually purchase with specie, a circumstance which gives them a decided preference at Batavia or any other of the Dutch settlements to which they are allowed to resort, because the payment in specie is of considerable moment in the financial arrangements of the Java government. They also trade in small vessels, calculated to run with facility from port to port along the coasts of the independent native states; and from these collective causes they obtain an advantage which can only be met by affording corresponding facilities to the British merchant, in securing for him also a market among the Eastern islands, and permitting him to resort to that market freely and without reserve. In short, if the commercial resources of these islands be at all admitted to be an auxiliary in

the supply of the China market, every argument, whether drawn from domestic interest or foreign policy, seems to point out the advantage, not to say the necessity, of fostering the native industry of these islands, and obtaining a permanent connexion among them.

In the progress of this course of things also, a direct intercourse may possibly be established with Cochin China. The greatest obstacle to the success of former attempts has been found to arise from the influence which the French missionaries had obtained at the court; and, as many years have now elapsed since that period, probably a new succession of rulers will have produced new interests and views. The possibility may at any rate be adduced as a collateral argument in favour of an establishment near the China Sea; because the vicinity of such an establishment, and the connexions dependent on it, would necessarily facilitate communication with Cochin China; and the known products of that country, as well as the particular advantages of its locality with reference to

China, Borneo, and the Philippines, would guarantee an ample repayment of expense if the attempt proved successful.

The same observation, though in a lesser degree, may be applied to Japan; and it may not be uninteresting to give a concise history of the circumstances which have transpired from the commercial adventures sent to that country, in the years 1814 and 1815, from Batavia.

In the years 1813 and 1814 the local government of Java resolved to send a mission to Nangazacky, for the purpose of taking possession of the Dutch factory there, under the capitulation which stipulated for the surrender of the several dependencies on Java, and, at the same time, to take a proper opportunity of communicating to the Japanese government the annihilation of Holland as a separate and independent nation, the conquest of Java, and the willingness of the existing government to continue the commercial relations which had here-

tofore subsisted, and been annually carried on from Batavia. This, however, was required to be done with peculiar caution and delicacy, because it was known that an edict had been issued by the Japanese government some few years before, directing acts of reprisal against British ships, in consequence of their having taken offence at supplies having been obtained in a compulsory manner by the commander of a ship cruising in that neighbourhood. There was nothing therefore in the appearance of the present adventure that should disclose at once its nature and object, the cargo was assorted agreeably to former usage, and the ships were to enter the harbour of Nangazacky according to ancient forms, and under Dutch colours.

Upon the arrival of the commissioners the Dutch chief of the factory refused to consider himself bound by the capitulation of Java; and, by representing the danger that would result if he were to make known to the Japanese governor the real character of the expedition, in-

duced the commissioners to agree that the commercial adventure should be carried through according to former usage, and without any political proceedings whatever. The commission therefore returned without having effected the main object of the voyage.

But the government at Batavia were by no means satisfied with this procedure; they considered the failure to have been mainly owing to the intrigue of the officers of the factory; and they were strengthened in this opinion by the following circumstance. It is customary that on the departure of the ships from Nangazack for Batavia at the close of the annual consignment, a private signal is given to ensure the admission and friendly reception of the following year; and when, on the present occasion, this custom was renewed, the Japanese interpreters (who are the channel of communication between the factory and the governor of Nangazack) secretly gave the commissioners a duplicate of the next year's signal, in order

that no intrigue of the Dutch chief of the factory might prevent their return to Japan; intimating to them, at the same time, that the real character of the expedition was no secret.

It was therefore determined to repeat the attempt in the year following;—but during the interval the situation of affairs had become changed by the arrival of intelligence of the results of the battle of Waterloo; and the further prosecution of the plan was abandoned, except that one ship was sent to Japan in the years 1814 and 1815, with a cargo which had been already prepared.

I shall conclude this part of the subject with some information, obtained from the persons employed on this occasion, and annex in an appendix\* an abstract of the results of consignments to Japan, in further illustration of it.

The Dutch trade from Batavia to Japan is

\* Vide appendix.



regulated by specific agreement as to its extent and description. The export cargo from Batavia consists of sugar, woollens, piece goods, and small quantities of glass ware, spices, and ornamental fancy articles; in return for which, copper, camphor, silks, and lacquered ware, are received from the Japanese. The price of the merchandize is settled before the annual adventure commences; only a small sum of money is allowed to be brought to Japan, and no part of the cargo is paid for in specie, the Japanese laws prohibiting the exportation of the precious metals under any form; the whole trade therefore consists in barter, and the profit depends on the subsequent sale of the homeward bound cargo. At the close of one year's consignment the quantity and assortment of the following year's cargo is determined, and a list is sent to Batavia for the guidance of the authorities accordingly.

It has been the opinion of many of the best informed persons, however, that these restric-

tions on the quantity of cargo are very much owing to the mismanagement or intrigues of the officers of the factory, whose interest it is that the trade should not be so extensive as to interfere with their own privilege, or require more than one chief officer to conduct it; and the commissioner who went to Nangazacky in the year 1814 expressly declares, that, in his opinion, the present state of the trade is no criterion for judging of the extent to which it might be carried;—he says, “The climate, the habits of the people, and their freedom from any prejudices that would obstruct the operation of these natural causes, would open a vent for numerous articles of European comfort and luxury. The consumption of woollens and hard ware might be rendered almost unlimited;—they are fond of the finer specimens of the glass manufacture, and the returns from Japan, which have hitherto been limited to their copper and camphor, some lacquered ware, a small quantity of silks, and a few other things of trifling importance, may be extended

to a long list. Specimens of teas, pitch, borax, iron, cinnabar, linseed oil, whale oil, and other articles which may be obtained, have been brought to Java by this opportunity."

The same gentleman has also observed, that so far as his local knowledge enabled him to form a judgment, the real difficulties of introducing the British flag in Japan, inasmuch as they depend on the character and political institutions of the Japanese, are much less than they have been represented to be. He was of opinion, that the ill success of the attempts hitherto made has been chiefly owing to the misrepresentations which it has been the policy of the Dutch government to keep up, in order to secure their own commercial monopoly; and that the failure of the Russian embassy in 1804, as well as the offence taken at the entrance of the British frigate into the harbour of Nangazack in the year 1808, may be in a great measure attributed to the effects of this policy. In short, from the various opinions expressed by

persons who were at Nangazacky with the commercial adventure in 1813 and 1814, it seems reasonable to conclude that, although the recent re-establishment of the Dutch factory under its ancient forms will have re-opened the usual supply of European goods, and will consequently have taken away the particular advantages that were to be contemplated while the British authority ruled in Java, there is still sufficient prospect of success to justify an attempt being made, if the objects to be acquired be considered worth the expense of a trial. And this conclusion is confirmed by the following circumstance :—When at the close of the commercial consignment sent in the years 1814 and 1815, the chief of the factory, calculating on the change which had taken place in Europe, renewed his declaration that he would not receive another consignment except on his own terms, he requested the Japanese interpreters to transmit a declaration, on their part, that they could not answer for the consequences of any departure from the plan which

he proposed. The interpreters did so; but they concluded by saying—"It is, however, of no importance who is sent as chief of the factory, provided a lasting peace has been established at Batavia." This expression could only imply, that if the government had become settled, whether English or Dutch, the trade might be continued; because it is very evident that the Japanese knew the real character of the expeditions sent from Batavia by the British authorities, and were aware of the conquest of Java; and as no doubt was ever entertained of the Dutch being received at Nangazacky, the remark was useless if applied to the Netherlands government only.

Upon the whole, then, I think it may be assumed, that, in a commercial point of view, there is a considerable opening among the Indian islands, which it would be desirable to occupy, before the further advances of other nations shall have excluded us altogether. It remains to shew, that the longer this question

is postponed, the greater will be the difficulty as well as necessity of acting with effect; and that it is politically expedient to obtain a naval station in the Eastern seas, while it can be done without injury to the just rights of others.

The only power with whom there would at present be any actual contact is the government of the Netherlands; it is necessary, therefore, to consider, what are the rights which that government has acquired by the convention concluded in the year 1814. This convention has restored the factories and establishments which the Dutch possessed in the Eastern seas in the commencement of 1803, viz. Java and its dependencies, Celebes, and the smaller islands situated in the straits of Macassar, the Moluccas, Malacca on the Malay peninsula, and sundry establishments on the island of Sumatra: it has also ceded to them the island of Banca; but as it contains no explanatory article whatever, there is still this question, as before observed, whether a formal abandonment by the

Dutch government, subsequently to January, 1803, of establishments which had been held by them previously to that date, constitutes an exclusion of such establishments from the provisions of the convention of 1814? And on the decision upon this point would depend the present right of the Netherlands government to consider their former factories on the island of Borneo as a part of the recent restitution.

It is evident, from what has already been stated, that the commercial relations between Great Britain and Holland, in the Eastern seas, are not the same now as they were when the Dutch were in the plenitude of their commercial monopoly in that quarter of the world. Of late years, the British have acquired a direct and frequent intercourse with the native states in the Indian Archipelago, and, from that intercourse, have established new relations which have assisted in augmenting the amount of capital employed in the British trade to China. The Dutch, therefore, can no longer exercise

the same restrictive policy and nominal control among the Eastern states, without committing a positive injury on the trade which has been legitimately acquired by Great Britain; nor can they extend their control over Borneo and the Straits of Malacca, without encroaching beyond the bounds which the convention of 1814 has restored to them; consequently, much depends on the system of policy pursued by the present government of Java.

Now the whole course of proceedings adopted by that government tends to revive the former system of monopoly and exclusion. They commenced, at the time of the restitution of Java, by refusing to admit the slightest interference, or any community of interests, on the part of the British government in the possessions ceded or restored to them: it was their earnest endeavour to induce the natives to conclude that Great Britain had no longer any regard or influence in their behalf. They have since an-



nulled the very treaty by which the power of ceding the island of Banca to them was obtained, and have sent the sultan of Palembang a prisoner to Batavia, as a punishment for his having solicited that protection which he was justly entitled to expect from the British nation; and it appears, by recent accounts, that they have assumed a paramount authority at Banjarmassin, at Sambas, and at Pontiana, and declare the Netherlands government to be the sovereign of Borneo. But one step more is wanting; if, with the same system and views, they establish themselves also on the western side of the China sea; if they obtain the islands of Bintang and Lingin, and of the south-east coast of the Malay peninsula, (positions which they are known to have in view) the British merchant will become wholly excluded from direct trade to the Indian islands, and will not have one port between Penang and China to which he can resort, except under the control and direction of a foreign power. The Nether-

lands government have Batavia on one side, and seek to obtain Rhio\* on the other; by the former they already command the Straits of Sunda, by the latter they would acquire a naval station at the entrance from the Straits of Malacca to the China sea; while the possession of Malacca and Johore, on the southern Malay coast, would complete their command of these straits; and thus the direct route of the British trade to China would have to pass along a line of foreign settlements, while Great Britain would possess no naval station nearer than Ceylon and Penang. The vexatious difficulties to which this state of things would lead, and the eventual insecurity of the British trade, under such circumstances, must be too obvious to require comment.

The local enactments of the Java government lead also to the same system of exclusion. By regulations passed last year, foreign vessels are

\* The chief port and harbour in the island of Bintang.

not permitted to touch at the minor ports in Java; all the cargo must be taken in at the port from which the vessel is cleared out, an import and export duty of twelve per cent. is imposed, while six per cent. is paid on the cargoes of Netherlands ships; and it is also understood that the old system has been revived of requiring all native traders at the ports under the control of the Netherlands government, to take passes from the resident European authority; a practice which necessarily tends to force the native trade to such ports as the Java government may prefer, and restricts other nations from a direct participation therein.

In whatever point of view, therefore, the question is considered, it seems essential to interpose for the purpose of preventing the revival of this injurious and pernicious system; injurious as it regards the legitimate pretensions of other nations, and pernicious as it presents a barrier against that improvement of the native population, which, in the present enlightened

state of Europe, ought to be a subject of general anxiety. It might not, indeed, be so immediately destructive to the commercial interests of Great Britain, if the government of the Netherlands were satisfied with what the convention of 1814 has restored, and would not seek to establish their control over countries which were not in contemplation when that convention was concluded; but every act of that government is of a different tendency; and the very great exertions which have been made, and are still making, shew the importance attached to the object. The latest advices mention, that the Netherlands government have a squadron of ships of war at Batavia considerably larger than that which Great Britain retains in the Indian seas, and have about 10,000 European troops in their Eastern settlements, independently of their colonial corps. With what view can this expense be incurred, unless to establish a supreme authority in that quarter of the world?

Surely, then, it would be injudicious to delay until these plans have become matured, and have acquired that plea which a continued possession and a lapse of time would give to them. The acts of the local government of Java, whether in taking possession of factories and establishments which were not held by the Dutch government in the year 1803, such as Sambas and Pontiana, or in restricting the independent native trade, as in assuming a supremacy over the island of Borneo, cannot of themselves be considered sufficient to constitute a right of possession; and it will still remain open to other nations, particularly to Great Britain, under the relations in which she stands with the government of the Netherlands, to interpose and remove the seeds of future dispute, by a liberal and friendly adjustment of the fair pretensions of both parties. Moreover, the results of the late restitution of Java and its dependencies afford a means of mutual concession and sacrifice, if such be required. There is a balance

of about 500,000*l.* sterling, which is admitted to be due to the British government, in the transfer of Java to the government of the Netherlands; and there is a further sum of about 250,000*l.*, disputed indeed, but which is claimed for the British government on just and equitable grounds. Why may not the settlement of these demands be united with an adjustment of the future commerce of the Indian Archipelago, on that system of liberal and generous policy which is consistent with the acknowledged views of the ruling powers in Europe, and with the amicable relations now subsisting between Great Britain and the Netherlands?

An adjustment of this nature may be considered in two points of view; separately, as including only those countries where the Netherlands government had not, at the date of the latest advices from that quarter, actually formed any establishment; or, more collectively, as including those positions which have been occupied since the restitution of Java, but which

were not actually transferred with Java at the time of that restitution.

The Netherlands government have no possessions to the westward of the island of Banca, excepting Malacca, which factory, if not comprehended in one general system of possessing every thing to the eastward of Penang, would be of no great value to them. It may also, I presume, be granted, that the government of the Netherlands has no right, under the terms of the convention of 1814, to claim a supremacy over minor ports, which were some forty years ago subject to the control of the Dutch, but had been formally abandoned by them previously to the year 1803; and, under this point of view, the native state of Johore, situated on the south-east point of the Malay peninsula, is free to form engagements with other European powers, while no claim can exist on the states of Rhio and Lingin, because the supremacy of the Dutch has never been established in those islands.

The island of Bintang, in which is situated the port and harbour of Rhio, is about thirty miles in length, and ten miles in breadth, and contains about 7000 inhabitants; and Rhio, as has been already noticed in a former part of these observations, having long been the resort of the Malay and Chinese traders, is peculiarly well situated for a commercial station : the harbour will contain from twenty to thirty large ships, in safe and excellent anchorage, but is liable to objection, in consequence of the approach to it through the straits of Rhio being somewhat intricate, and impeded by a shoal, which renders the channel narrow for ships of burden ; I am, however, informed, that the sea is almost constantly calm and quiet, and that the difficulty of entrance is not so great as to be attended with danger. Bintang furnishes fresh provisions, and good water in abundance, and the neighbouring island of Lingen is rich in the ordinary produce of the Indian islands, particularly in gambier, which is an article in constant use among the Javanese and Malays.



Rhio, therefore, would become a valuable mart or emporium, where the merchandise exported from Great Britain, or British India, might be collected and exchanged for the products of the Indian islands calculated for the China market; it would also be a central station, whence a further connexion with the independent native states might be formed, and an adequate squadron be placed, when necessary, in the ordinary track of the British trade to China.

I have before remarked that the Dutch had not any possession or control in the islands of Bintang and Lingin in the year 1803, and no trace is to be discovered among the collection of treaties and contracts with native states, which were found among the records at Batavia, of their ever having exercised, in these islands, the supremacy which they had elsewhere established in the Indian Archipelago. The circumstance also of a mission having some months ago been sent to Rhio by the

governor general in council at Fort William, for the purpose of forming an establishment there, provided the Netherlands government had not already preceded us, confirms this opinion, because it may be presumed that the act of having sent this mission proves that no known obstacle existed on the ground of any right possessed by another nation. The native chiefs of Bintang and Rhio may consequently be considered independent of the control of any European power, and free to select that connexion which is most agreeable to themselves; and they have more than once expressed a desire to receive a British establishment, and their willingness to conclude a treaty for that purpose.

If this mission has been successful, the possession of Rhio will of course become the nucleus whence the farther connection with the native states will proceed; and if not successful, it becomes the more necessary to interpose and to fix the commercial relations in the Eastern seas on

a secure and decided footing, before the local clashing of interests has led to injury and dispute.

If then it be asked what position of circumstances would be most likely to remove the local causes of difference between Great Britain and the Netherlands, the question may be readily answered by suggesting that the eastern side of the Straits of Sunda and the western side of the China sea should become the boundary of the respective establishments of the two nations; thus leaving Sumatra and Banca, together with the Straits of Malacca and the adjacent islands, to be occupied by the British, while the Dutch retained Borneo, Java, and the different islands to the eastward of the Straits of Sunda.

But if such an arrangement were found to involve too many of the positions which have unfortunately been conceded and overlooked when the convention of 1814 was concluded, the British trade ought at any rate to have free access

to all the ports where the local administration and government of the country is not exercised by the European power who controls its trade, and appropriates its produce. The custom of the Dutch government has been to establish a single public agent as director of the local trade of a port, and obtain a treaty or contract with the native chief to the exclusion of other nations; but it can hardly be sufficient in the present state of the Indian commerce, that the residence of a harbour-master and a few individual merchants should constitute an exclusive right of possession: nor can it be admitted that a treaty concluded with a native prince or chief, in which the sovereignty of his country is ceded to the Netherlands government, should convey to that government a dominion over territories not actually held or administered by the prince who thus cedes them. Yet it is in history that the power of the Dutch government in the Indian Archipelago was raised by their treaties with the native states having been made to comprehend the cession of all islands which

have at any former period acknowledged the supremacy of that state, but were not actually in subjection or tributary to it at the time of the treaty being concluded; and it is only in this way that the Netherlands government can now pretend to a sovereignty over the island of Borneo.

Those positions, therefore, which are not already occupied should be obtained without further delay; the recent proceedings of the government-general in India should be supported and maintained; and it then remains to conclude such further arrangements for the more clear and better understanding of the commerce of the Eastern seas, and for that amelioration and freedom of intercourse which the numerous population in these countries have a just right to expect.

It may be urged perhaps that the natives in the Indian Archipelago are in a state of anarchy and uncivilization, which unfits them for en-

gaging in peaceable intercourse, and renders it improbable that the trade with them would become of sufficient value to repay the expense, much less justify any sacrifice to obtain it. But although I am free to admit that the introduction of regular commercial habits, and the abolition of their present custom of having their vessels equally prepared for plunder or for trade, cannot be the work of a moment, I believe that the barbarism of these tribes has been very greatly exaggerated, and I am satisfied that their piratical habits are very much owing to the state of degradation in which they have been held. Remove the cause, and the effect would cease; permit them to enjoy quietly and without restraint the fruits of industry, and there is no peculiar difficulty that should prevent the usual progress of freedom and of civilization among them. The same report was given of the inhabitants of Java, and was credited until the experience of the British administration in that island had shewn that there exists not a people more mild in character and

more accessible to kindness than the Javanese are; and although the present habits of the Malay tribes are less refined and civilized, there is no reason to suppose that they are more inaccessible than their neighbours. I will not pretend to say that the first British vessels trading to their ports would in every instance meet with the reception or the profit that could be wished, more especially in the first opening of the communication; but what I am anxious to establish is, that the means may be found, within the circle above described, of ameliorating the condition of some millions of our fellow-creatures, and of obtaining, with that amelioration, a permanent and material advancement of our own national prosperity.

A conquest of the countries, or even a resident control over the government of them, would not be either necessary or politic; it is sufficient to form such connexions with them as would prevent any other nation assuming that control to our exclusion, and establishing a mo-

nopoly destructive to the local industry of the population. This might, I conceive, be effected by the possession of an establishment in their neighbourhood, which, at the same time that it offered to them a market for the purchase of their commodities and the supply of their wants, should contain a sufficient naval force to command respect and ensure protection; and, as our commercial relations extended, a second such establishment might be added, and communications be occasionally held with the neighbouring states, or in particular instances, an officer of inferior rank be sent to reside as an agent. A more extended plan than this would not, I presume, be required; for it would be an essential part of the system to leave the native trader perfectly free from restraint; and if the commercial objects in contemplation are to be effectually sought for, the British merchant should be at liberty to trade freely to the different ports, and to make his engagements as best suited his own convenience; with no



greater restrictions than what may be found absolutely necessary to secure to the East India Company the exclusive commercial privileges which they already possess in China.

An establishment at the port of Rhio, and either the North-west part of Borneo, or near the Suluh islands, would embrace the extremes of a first undertaking, and would not trespass on the known rights or possessions of any other power. There is a harbour on the coast of Borneo Proper ; and in the Suluh islands, although Suluh itself is not a convenient port, an excellent harbour is formed with the main island by Pulo Talain, which contains a safe and extensive anchorage, and is in the vicinity of a well cultivated country, abounding with good water and supplies.

Or, if the establishments which have been recently formed on the Western coast of Borneo can be matter of negotiation, and the trade

to that coast can be recovered, Pontiana will naturally become a principal place of resort. The trade of this port is considerable\*; there is a population of between 40 and 50,000 Chinese residing near the gold-mines, who have a domestic government among themselves, but pay tribute to the Malay sultan of Pontiana; and the revenues of this chief are estimated to average 180,000 dollars per annum, including a capitation tax on the Chinese, at the rate of one Spanish dollar per head; and the value of 50 bankals of gold, which is the amount of the

\* The annual demand for the Pontiana market is estimated to require

8 to 10,000 bales of piece goods,  
250 to 300 chests of opium,  
1000 peculs of Swedish iron,  
300 peculs of steel, and,  
400 coyangs of salt;

besides cotton cloths of Malay patterns, a few bales of broad-cloths, some chintzes, hardware, &c. And this independently of the Malay and China trade to the port.

In return, Pontiana furnishes about 20 peculs of gold; some diamonds, birds'-nests, camphor, betle-nut, and other articles which have already been enumerated, as being common to the islands in this Archipelago.

revenue paid on the produce of the mines\*. The trade to this port had, previously to the restitution of Java to his Netherlands majesty's government, been for several years in the hands of the free merchants resident in the East India Company's possessions; and it is a tribute justly due to the judgment and foresight of Sir Stamford Raffles to add, that if *his* views and wishes had been carried into execution, a chain of establishments, wholly unconnected with the conquest of Java and independent of the provisional possession of that island, would have been formed along the track of the China sea, and would have obtained without difficulty every one of those national objects of which it may with truth be said, that the longer they are delayed, the greater will be found to be the necessity of looking after them.

At the same time I think it may be asserted,

\* It is calculated, but the information is not so complete as to make the calculation at all certain, that about 50 parets of gold are annually obtained from the mines in Succadana.

that the plan which it is the object of these remarks to recommend to public notice would not only require no considerable expense in the first instance, but may even be considered economical, if it be admitted that the security of the commercial interests of this country renders it advisable to have a naval station more near to the China sea than at present.

After the first cost of placing the new establishment in a posture of security against foreign aggression, and of constructing those works of defence which every distant position must require, no large expense would be necessary to conduct the details of an administration which is intended principally for commercial purposes without monopoly, and does not contemplate any acquisition of territory, nor any direction of the internal government of other countries. In time of peace, therefore, it would require no larger defensive means than those which are thought necessary in the neighbouring British settlements, and when-

ever war takes place it immediately acquires an increase of value and importance, which would, even with the most scrupulous person, justify a larger expenditure on account of it.

Should a war occur in Europe, which though sincerely to be deprecated cannot be considered to be an impossibility, our China trade would have to pass along a line of foreign ports; should war at any time occur with the Netherlands government, that line of ports would become actively hostile; and even in the event of a war with the United States of America, it is of importance to possess a harbour near the China seas, because experience has shewn that the Americans make the entrance of the Straits of Sunda a principal station for their cruisers, and resort to the neighbouring bays for water during their cruise. In any case of war therefore the facilities which the new establishment would then possess in affording a naval station for the protection of the China trade would soon repay the expense, if it were

only in the single circumstance of lessening the distance of convoys.

Moreover, if the British flag were established at Rhio, other establishments might be considerably reduced; there could then be no question as to the practicability of dispensing with a separate government and council, at Prince of Wales island; and the savings effected in the one instance may very fairly be set off against the expense incurred in the other. Penang, since it has been pronounced by professional authority to be inconvenient as a naval station, derives its value from the proportion of native trade resorting to it, or as it may be considered an emporium to the British merchant trading to the Eastern islands or China. It was this commerce which contributed so much to raise its prosperity after the conquest of Malacca, and when Java was held in a state of blockade; but the same causes have ceased to exist; for, whether Rhio become a

British possession or not, the settlement in Prince of Wales's Island cannot expect to recover what it has lost ; because if a new establishment be formed at Rhio, the native traders will undoubtedly rather go to that port than to Penang ; and if the policy of the Netherlands government be successful, the native trade will not be suffered to find its way direct into any British port whatever. In either case, therefore, the expense of government at Prince of Wales's Island is susceptible of reduction ; and any amount so gained may be considered to come in aid of an establishment which has in view the very same objects that were contemplated in securing the possession of Penang.

With this remark I shall conclude the present observations ; and if they lead to a further investigation of the subject of them, by any person better informed than myself with regard to it, or induce a more general at-

tention to the propriety of obtaining a position in the Indian Archipelago, while yet it can be done without aggression on the legitimate rights of other nations, my object in offering them to public notice will have been accomplished.



## **APPENDIX.**

## A

*Abstract Account of the Annual Commercial Adventure, from Batavia to Japan, in the Year 1806.*

Dr.		Cr.	
	Sp. Dol. Strs.		Sp. Dol. Strs.
To invoice price of the outward bound cargo	161,008 62	By sale proceeds, at Japan, of the outward cargo	100,557 30
Charges at Batavia	5,692 0	Presents from the Emperor	2,812 32
Freight of two ships, at 100 dollars per ton	99,532 32	By amount sales of 8,238 peculs of copper, at 50 Spanish dollars per pecul	411,942 0
	105,224 32	Ditto camphor, at 40 stuivers per lb.	48,350 0
<i>Charges at Japan.</i>		Total	563,661 62
Presents to the Emperor	10,800 0	Amount debits	388,156 28
Ditto to inferior officers at the court	5,516 0		
Ditto to the Japanese guard	1,480 0	Balance, being the profit on this concern	175,505 34
Annual salary of the Company's officers	1,345 0		
Ditto table allowance ditto	3,750 0		
Commission, 5 per cent. on the cargo	7,143 0		
Annual rent to the Japanese	3,462 0		
Charges in landing and storing cargo	3,036 0		
Short deliveries and petty charges	2,193 30		
	39,625 30		
<i>Purchase of Homeward-bound Cargo.</i>			
8,520 peculs of copper, of 120 $\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.			
the pecul	73,485 40		
640 ditto of camphor, ditto	7,360 0		
Bales	413 8		
4,500 chests for packing copper	791 16		
2,200 planks for dunnage	247 32		
	82,297 32		
Total	388,156 28		

(A true copy)

J. G. BAUER,

Accountant.

Batavia, the 8th of December, 1814.

# B

## Account of the Commercial Adventure sent to Japan in the Year 1813—14.

Dr.		Cr.	
	Sp. Dol. Cts.		Sp. Dol. Cts.
To involeu cost of outward-bound cargo . . .	170,527 16	<i>By Cargo brought from Japan.</i>	
Allowance to the chief of the Factory for 1400 pe- culs of copper . . . . .	25,709 25	902,452 lbs. of copper, at 61 <sup>7</sup> / <sub>8</sub> Spanish dollars per pecul (this price being estimated instead of 50 Spanish dollars; because a considerable part of it is used in the coinage of colonial copper duits in Java, and this coinage gives more than 84 dollars per pecul of copper) . . . . .	441,052 89
Freight of two ships . . . . .	85,094 0	60,437 lbs. of camphor, which has been sold by auction for . . . . .	28,204 50
Presents to the Emperor . . . . .	4,845 11	1,208 lbs. of pitch, sold for . . . . .	600 0
Interest . . . . .	6,000 0	Add	
Insurance . . . . .	12,000 0	Damaged goods brought back and sold . . . . .	1,284 0
Salaries and allowances to the commissioners and officers employed on this occasion . . . . .	32,540 75	Advances left at Nangazaeky for the ex- penses of the journey of the resident to the court at Jedo . . . . .	8,202
Sundry charges, as per statement . . . . .	22,098 25	Woollens to be given as presents on this occasion . . . . .	15,000
Balance due to the Treasury at Nangazaeky, and paid previously to commencing the annual ad- venture . . . . .	3,519 33		23,202 0
Total . . . . .	362,333 85	Total . . . . .	494,343 39
Amount credit side . . . . .	494,343 39		
Balance in favour of the voyage . . . . .	132,099 54		
To which is to be added			
The debt of the former Dutch government to the Emperor of Japan, which has been paid out of the proceeds of this cargo, viz. . . . .	48,648 0		
Total profit . . . . .	180,657 54		

J. G. BAUER,

Accountant.

Batavia, the 8th of December, 1814.

## C

*Account of the Adventure sent from Batavia to Japan in the Year 1814—15.*

Dr.	Sp. Dol. Cts.
Invoice cost of the outward cargo . . .	91,221 85
Freight of the ship . . .	72,000 0
Allowance to the chief of the factory for 700 peculs of copper . . .	12,727 27
Presents to the Emperor . . .	5,089 9
Interest . . .	3,000 0
Insurance . . .	6,000 0
Petty charges . . .	1,488 47
Salaries to the officers employed from Batavia . .	7,642 64
	<hr/>
	199,169 32
Balance due to the Emperor of Japan, lent for the purpose of completing the expenses in the beginning of the year 1815 . . .	3,791 3
	<hr/>
Total . . .	202,960 35
Balance in favour of this voyage . . .	17,256 31
	<hr/>
Spanish dollars . . .	220,216 66

Cr.	Pec. Cattles	Sp. Dol. Cts.	Sp. Dol. Cts.
<i>By the under-mentioned Articles received from Japan, viz.—</i>			
Camphor, Dutch weight . . .	290 40,		
sold for . . .		17,842 93	
Copper . . .	6,470 112 $\frac{1}{2}$ ,		
sold for . . .		190,558 10	
Pitch . . .	24 0,		
sold for . . .		48 0	
50 Japan gowns, sold for . . .		1,000 0	
		<hr/>	209,449 3
<i>By H. Doeff.</i>			
Amount of cash left with him for defraying the charges attendant on the customary journey to Jedo, which he was to have undertaken in the year 1815 . . .		2,767 63	
Amount of woollens for the same purpose . . .		8,000 0	
		<hr/>	10,767 63
Total . . .			220,216 66

J. G. BAUER.

Accountant.

Batavia, the 24th of October, 1815.

## D

*Particulars of the Cargo exported from Batavia to Japan, in  
the Year 1806, on account of the Government.*

1,269,679 lbs. of Sugar

25,000 — Tin

102,000 — Sappan wood

17,087 — Cloves

10,000 — Pepper

100 — Nutmegs

6,000 — Cotton thread

6,082 ells of Woollens

2,842 — Kerseymeres

778 — Plush

59 ps. of Fustians

40 — Reselets

20 — Carpets, English

1,873 — Kerseys

4,900 — Chintzes, Bengal

590 — Ditto, Guzerat

190 — Cabayahs, Malabar

240 — Palempores,

And suudry small quantities of  
Fish skins, Elephants teeth, and  
other articles.

3,500 Ducatoons

## E

*Articles shipped from Batavia for Japan in the Year 1813—14.*

1,836,270	lbs. of	Sugar
18,750	—	Black pepper
34,349	—	Pig lead
26,461	—	Rolls ditto
164,000	—	Sappan wood
50	—	Mummy
87,511	—	Tin
15,000	—	Cloves
12,500	—	Nutmegs
15,013½	—	Cotton thread
5,119	pieces of	Patna chintz
60	—	Coast ditto
166	—	Printed cottons
2,610	—	Surat palempores
623	—	Silks, in sorts
225	—	Woollens, in sorts
298	—	Long ells, in sorts
231	—	Perpetrians
54	—	Camblets
3,500		Ducatoons

## F

*List of Articles which the Japanese requested should be sent in  
the Annual Consignment of 1814—15.*

		200 pieces of Woollens, of different colours
120	—	Coarse cottons
1,200	—	Taffechelabs
3,600	—	Chintzes
400	—	Silk stuffs
400	—	Taffetys
20	—	Silk, with gold embroidery
20	—	Ditto, with silver ditto
10,000	lbs. of	Cotton thread
5,250	—	Cloves
4,000	—	Pepper
5,000	—	Pœtjock
9,000	—	Surat katjoe
1,250	—	Elephants teeth
50	—	Mummy
23,000	—	Lead
25,000	—	Tin
250	—	Quicksilver
100,000	—	Sappan wood
1,250,000	—	Sugar
3,500		Ducatoons

This list is exclusive of sundry articles which are men-

tioned as being required for the Emperor and for the principal officers at Nangazacky—and which consist of cloths, chintzes, glass ware, books, birds, and curiosities. Some of the latter are of a ludicrous description, and show that the lists have been prepared by the Japanese themselves.

FINIS.



LONDON:  
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.

14

